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Abstract
This paper examines the importance of induced technological change
in considering the eciency costs of environmental policy. In partic-
ular, in modeling an endogenous formation of energy-saving technol-
ogy through a variety of intermediates, the paper studies the welfare
eects of environmental tax reform in a general equilibrium model.
Using this model, the paper shows that environmental tax reform in-
duces an expansion of the variety of intermediates by increasing rents
from innovating new intermediates and, thereby, brings technologi-
cal change. Then, the induced variety expansion by environmental
tax reform achieves positive externalities and plays an important role
both to decrease the eciency costs and to improve the environmental
quality.
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1 Introduction
The trade-o between environmental quality and economic eciency has
been controversial in the design of environmental policy. To mitigate envi-
ronmental problems without causing serious damage to economic eciency,
economists have considered a number of policy packages and examined the
economic impacts in dierent situations. In this context, an environmental
tax has been focused on because it has two properties: (i) it raises gov-
ernment revenues and (ii) it induces innovations of environmentally friendly
technology.
The revenue-raising property can play an important role in the second-
best economy where economic ineciencies preexist because of distortionary
taxes such as an income tax. Then, the ineciencies may be reduced by
using environmental tax revenues to cut preexisting distortionary tax rates
under constant government revenues. This policy package works as both
environmental regulation and scal reform and is known as environmental tax
reform. This policy is expected to improve not only environmental quality
(a rst dividend) but also economic eciency (a second dividend); i.e., there
is a double dividend.
However, theoretical studies using general equilibrium models such as
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Parry (1995) and Goulder et al. (1997) show
that environmental tax reform exacerbates rather than improves economic
eciencies. This result is driven by two opposite welfare eects. First, by
replacing distortionary taxes, environmental tax reform can decrease preex-
isting distortions. This is called the revenue-recycling eect, which improves
welfare. Second, a price rise of nal goods from the environmental tax makes
households substitute the nal goods for leisure and, thereby, decreases labor
supply. By shifting the labor supply curve to the left, this path decreases gov-
ernment revenues from a labor income tax and increases marginal distortions
per unit of income tax revenue. This eect is known as the tax-interaction ef-
fect, which decreases welfare. Previous studies reveal that the tax-interaction
eect is greater than the revenue-recycling eect under plausible conditions,
and that the double dividend cannot be obtained.1
In contrast to the former general studies, some subsequent studies exam-
ines special cases to reconsider the magnitude of the tax-interaction eect
(e.g., Schwartz and Repetto, 1997; Parry and Bento, 2000; Williams, 2002;
1Previous papers nd that a strict increase in both environmental quality and economic
eciency (i.e., a strict double dividend) is not attained. Meanwhile, a weak double divi-
dend can be obtained, that is, eciency costs are smaller in the case where environmental
tax revenues are transferred in a lump-sum fashion. For details, see Goulder (1995) and
Bovenberg (1999).
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Bento and Jacobsen, 2007; Yamagami, 2009). Although these studies indi-
cate the possibility of a double dividend, there is a tendency to assume ex-
ogenous factor productivity and an independent production technology from
environmental policies. In fact, an increasing number of empirical studies
conrm a positive correlation between stringency of environmental regula-
tions and total factor productivity or factor-specic productivity, especially
in relation to emission abatement and energy conservation. For example,
Jae et al. (2002), Loschel (2002) and Popp et al. (2009) provide broad
surveys on the technological change induced by environmental regulations.
Moreover, Goulder and Schneider (1999), Goulder and Mathai (2000) and
Buonanno et al. (2001) numerically demonstrate the cost-eectiveness of the
induced technological change in achieving a given goal of emission reduction.
That is, the introduction of environmental policies can improve productivity
by inducing the technological change and, thereby, aect the overall costs
of environmental policies. This fact naturally raises the question of how the
induced technological change aects the costs of environmental tax reform,
that is, the tax-interaction eect. Therefore, the present paper sheds light
on the other property of an environmental tax that induces innovations of
environmentally friendly technology, in the framework of environmental tax
reform. For this purpose, the paper models an endogenous formation of
production technology related to natural resource use.2
Among previous papers on environmental tax reform, that by Bento and
Jacobsen (2007) is closely related to our work in relation to resource use. In
their paper, the resource is regarded as a xed factor while labor is assumed
to be a unique variable input. Furthermore, they suppose that pollution
emissions occur as a function of output. In this model, they show that
increasing emission costs as a result of an environmental tax are not fully
passed on to the price of nal goods because of the production function of
the decreasing-returns-to-scale. Then, the tax-interaction eect that arises
as a result of the price rise from the environmental tax is scaled down so
that the nonenvironmental dividend is obtained. However, because pollution
occurs as a function of output, a modest price rise of nal goods leads to
a small amount of pollution reduction instead of the small tax-interaction
eect. Therefore, they nd a trade-o between the two dividends.
This paper, in contrast, assumes the resource is a variable polluting fac-
tor and models an endogenous formation of resource-use productivity. A
2Investments in emission abatement or end-of-pipe technologies that are induced by
environmental policies are considered in the literature, for example, Goulder et al. (1997)
and Bovenberg et al. (2005). Although the literature nds that the emission abatement
technologies help in achieving the given goals of emission reduction with low eciency
costs, these technologies cannot create a double dividend.
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nal good related to pollution emissions is produced with energy services
and labor under the constant-returns-to-scale technology. Energy services
are manufactured by using a natural resource and a composite of intermedi-
ates (or blueprints) that a research and development (R&D) sector innovates
and provides in the monopolistic factor markets of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
By adopting these intermediates, a representative rm that produces the -
nal good constructs the technology level of processing natural resources into
energy services. Then, because the composite of these intermediates enables
the manufacture of a given amount of energy services with less of the natural
resource, the paper refers to the composite as the energy-saving technology.
With this model, the paper shows that an environmental tax endoge-
nously induces the technological change via an expansion of a variety of
intermediates. As the environmental tax raises rents for R&D rms from
innovating new intermediates by increasing demand for the energy-saving
technology, an expansion of the variety of intermediates is induced. Then,
the representative rm producing the nal good can substitute not only ex-
isting nonpolluting inputs but also newly innovated intermediates for the
polluting natural resource. Substitutions to newly innovated intermediates
cause positive externalities on the resource-use productivity of the represen-
tative rm and control a price rise of the nal good such as in Bento and
Jacobsen (2007). The tax-interaction eect is then narrowed and, thereby,
the nonenvironmental dividend is obtained. However, in contrast to Bento
and Jacobsen (2007), this paper supposes that pollution occurs in relation
to the amount of the resource used. The environmental dividend is then
higher relative to that shown in the previous papers because of the induced
expansion of the variety of intermediates for energy saving. Furthermore,
this paper nds that even if the double dividend is obtained because of the
positive externalities, the second-best optimal environmental tax rate can-
not exceed the rst-best level. The literature uses the optimal tax rate to
examine whether the double dividend occurs, whereas this paper shows that
it cannot be an indicator of the double dividend.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a model
with endogenous energy-saving technology formation and shows that a va-
riety of intermediates used for energy saving aects the energy-saving tech-
nology level. Section 3 considers environmental tax reform and its welfare
eects by examining how environmental tax reform aects the endogenously
determined variety of intermediates. Section 4 provides further discussions on
the contributions of the induced variety expansion of intermediates. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 The model
The present model refers to traditional general equilibrium models of envi-
ronmental tax reform (e.g., Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Parry, 1995; and
Goulder et al., 1997) and incorporates an endogenous productivity formation
via a variety of horizontally dierentiated intermediates a la Romer (1990).
2.1 Pollution emission
Pollution emission (E) occurs by using Z units of the natural resource. The
emission function is assumed to be linear as follows: E = Z, where  > 0 is
an emission coecient per unit of resource use.
2.2 Final goods
Following the literature, we suppose two types of nal consumption goods
(X and Y ). On the one hand, good X requires labor and energy services
as inputs and, therefore, pollution emissions occur in this sector. Good Y ,
on the other hand, is environmentally neutral in its production processes
because it requires only labor inputs.
2.2.1 Good Y
A representative rm competitively provides good Y by using LY units of
labor as a unique input. In particular, it is assumed that one unit of labor
produces one unit of good Y , i.e., Y = LY . Therefore, the price of good Y
corresponds to the wage rate, pY = w.
2.2.2 Good X
A representative rm produces good X by using R units of energy services
and LX units of labor under CES technology:
X =

LL
x 1
x
X + RR
x 1
x
 x
x 1
; (1)
where j (j = fL;Rg) is a scale parameter for each input, and x is the
elasticity of substitution between factors. Similar to the numerical models in
the previous papers, the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be strictly
positive and less than one (i.e., x 2 (0; 1)).
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Energy services are manufactured from Z units of the natural resource
by adopting H units of the energy-saving technology according to the Cobb{
Douglas function with an exogenous parameter r 2 (0; 1):
R = ZrH1 r : (2)
The energy-saving technology is characterized as a composite of horizontally
dierentiated intermediates or blueprints (h(i), i 2 [0; n]) in a CES function,
where n is the variety of available intermediates:
H =
Z n
0
h(i)1 rdi
 1
1 r
: (3)
That is, a combination of these intermediates forms a productivity of H
as the energy-saving technology used to process the natural resource and
manufacture the energy services.
Alternatively, as shown in Smulders and de Nooij (2003), these production
processes can be described more simply using the following expression:
AH =
Z n
0

h(i)
Z
1 r
di =

H
Z
1 r
: (4)
Using this expression allows us to rearrange (1) as follows:
X =

LL
x 1
x
X + R(AHZ)
x 1
x
 x
x 1
:
The production function (1) is thus presented in a conventional form with AH
as an endogenously determined factor augmentation for resource use. Then,
because the factor augmentation measures the productivity of intermediates
per unit of resource use for manufacturing energy services, we simply refer
to AH as the energy-saving technology level in the following.
Factor demand
From the above, the polluting rm faces the following total cost function:
TC = wLX + pZZ +
Z n
0
pH(i)h(i)di+ tEE; (5)
where pZ , pH(i) and tE are the price of the natural resource, the price of the
ith intermediate and the emission tax rate, respectively.
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By taking H as given, factor demand for the ith intermediate is given as
follows (see Appendix A.1 for the derivation):
h(i) =
pH(i)
  1
r HR n
0
pH(j)
  1 r
r dj
 1
1 r
: (6)
That is, the demand for each intermediate is decreasing in its own price, while
increasing in the prices of rival intermediates. Regarding the variety, when
all intermediates are assumed to be identical in pricing (i.e., pH(i) = pH(j),
8i 6= j 2 [0; n]), the demand for a certain intermediate (6) is rewritten as
h = n 1=(1 r)H. This expression indicates that an expansion of the variety
leads to a smaller demand for each existing intermediate because, taking H
as given, demand is equally spread among all intermediates including the
newly innovated ones.
Subsequently, taking R as given, the factor demands for the natural re-
source and energy-saving technology are derived as follows:
Z =

r
1  r
cH
cZ
1 r
R; (7)
H =

1  r
r
cZ
cH
r
R; (8)
where cZ and cH are the unit costs of resource use and energy-saving tech-
nology, dened as follows:
cZ  pZ + tE (9)
cH 
Z n
0
pH(i)
 (1 r)=rdi
 r=(1 r)
: (10)
As shown in (7) and (8), these factors are substitutes for each other under
a given amount of energy services. Therefore, (9) shows that the emission
tax causes a lower demand for the natural resource and a greater demand
for the energy-saving technology. Moreover, in the symmetric equilibrium
of pH(i) = pH(j) 8i 6= j 2 [0; n], (10) is rewritten in reduced form, cH =
n r=(1 r)pH , and the unit cost of energy-saving technology (10) is lowered
when the variety of intermediates is expanded.
Facing a given amount of supply for good X, the polluting rm demands
labor and energy services as follows:
LX =

L
w
x X 
xL w
1 x + xR c
1 x
R
 x
x 1
; (11)
R =

R
cR
x X 
xL w
1 x + xR c
1 x
R
 x
x 1
; (12)
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where cR is the unit cost of the energy service, dened as:
cR 

cH
1  r
1 r cZ
r
r
: (13)
Finally, by using (6) to (13), the total cost (5) is rearranged as follows:
TC = cX X; (14)
where cX is a unit cost to supply good X:
cX 
 
xL w
1 x + xR c
1 x
R
 1
1 x : (15)
Consequently, as the representative rm is assumed to be competitive, cX
corresponds to the marginal cost of producing good X. Then, the supply
curve of good X is horizontal at pX = cX .
2.3 R&D sector
The R&D sector in which intermediates for energy saving are innovated is
assumed to require FH units of labor input to develop a new intermedi-
ate and one unit of labor input to produce one unit of intermediate (i.e.,
h(i) = LH(i)). Moreover, these intermediates are priced under monopolistic
competition (cf. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Then, the prot function of rm
i is given as H(i) = fpH(i)  wgh(i)  wFH .
By using (6), a monopolistic price is set at:3
pH(i) =
w
1  r : (16)
Thus, the price of the ith intermediate is greater than the marginal cost
because of the markup rate, (1  r) 1 > 1.
2.4 Household
Following the literature (cf. Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Parry, 1995), a
representative household supplies L units of labor and consumes nal con-
sumption goods X and Y . In our model, the household receives additive
separable benets from G units of public services, and suers environmental
3It is supposed that each rm in the R&D sector is so small on a continuous space
that it cannot recognize an integral part of demand for its supplying intermediate. That
is, H and
R n
0
pH(i)
1 rdi in (6) are taken as given in monopolistic pricing. The demand
elasticity is then  pH(i)h(i) @h(i)@pH(i) = 1r by each rm.
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damages from pollution emissions. Then, her/his utility function is given
as: U = u0(G) + u1(X; Y; L  L) D(E), where L is the total time endow-
ment. Normalizing the wage rate to unity (i.e., w = 1 and therefore pY = 1)
and taking the price of consumption goods, environmental externalities and
policy instruments as given, the household maximizes its utility under the
budget constraint pXX + Y = (1  tL)L, where tL is the income tax rate.
The demand functions for consumption goods and a labor supply function
are then derived asX(pX ; tL); Y (pX ; tL); L(pX ; tL). By using these demand
and supply functions, the indirect utility from consuming private goods and
leisure is rewritten as v1(pX ; tL).
2.5 Government
The government balanced-budget constraint is written as:
TR = tLL+ tEE; (17)
where TR is the total government revenue requirement. The public services
are provided by spending this revenue. For simplicity, it is assumed that
one unit of labor input is employed to provide one unit of public service
(G = LG). As the wage rate is normalized to one, government revenue is
transformed to G = TR units of public services.
2.6 Equilibrium
As the wage rate is normalized to unity, the equilibrium in the nal goods
and labor markets is characterized by pX = cX and X(cX ; tL) for good X,
pY = 1 and Y (cX ; tL) for good Y and w = 1 and L(cX ; tL) = LX + LY +
nFH +
R n
0
LH(i)di+LG for labor. The natural resource, Z, is bought on the
world market; therefore, its price pZ is exogenous and the traded quantity is
determined by (7). Moreover, the equilibrium in the ith intermediate market
is characterized by a combination of its price and quantity, (pH(i); h(i)).
Then, the equilibrium price satises (16) and thus it is identical among all
intermediates markets (i.e., pH(i) = pH(j) 8i 6= j 2 [0; n]). This implies
that demand for dierentiated intermediates is identical (i.e., h(i) = h(j)
8i 6= j 2 [0; n]).
Equilibrium with free entry in intermediate markets
By unifying the prices of intermediates to pH , demand for each intermediate
(6) is rewritten as follows:
h = n 
1
1 rH: (18)
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From (18), it is clearly seen that, taking demand for energy-saving technology
as given, the demand for each intermediate decreases with respect to the
variety of intermediates as a result of spreading demand between existing
and new intermediates.
In contrast, by substituting (16) and (18), the prot function is rewritten
as:
H = w

r
1  rn
  1
1 rH   FH

:
That is, the demand for energy-saving technology, H, takes the form of
rents for each R&D rm from increasing sales and, thereby, prots. The
assumption of free entry implies that new entrants appear as long as the
prot is strictly positive. However, as (18) shows a decreasing demand for
existing intermediates in variety, new entry stops when the rents of each rm
in the R&D sector reach zero. Consequently, because the zero prot condition
holds at equilibrium, the variety of intermediates is nally determined as:
n =

r
1  r
H
FH
1 r
: (19)
Thus, the market equilibrium of all intermediates is identically characterized
by the free entry assumption and, as a result, leads to the endogenously
determined variety of intermediates (19). Then, the rents of the demand
for energy-saving technology, H, encourages potential R&D rms to develop
new intermediates while the xed costs discourage them.
Moreover, as the price of all intermediates is identical, as shown in (16),
the unit cost of energy-saving technology, cH , in (10) is rewritten as follows:
cH =
n r=(1 r)
1  r : (20)
The unit cost for energy-saving technology decreases with respect to the
variety of intermediates. That is, when a new intermediate appears, rm X
spreads the demand for each existing intermediate to satisfy a given amount
of demand for energy-saving technology.
Then, by substituting (7), (8), (9) and (20) into (4), the endogenous
energy-saving technology level, AH , can be rearranged as a function of the
number of available intermediates: AH =
n
(1 r)2
r
(pZ + tE)
o1 r
nr : This
expression indicates that the energy-saving technology level can be aected
by the emission tax, that is, that the induced technological change in energy
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saving occurs as a result of the emission tax. To show this, dierentiating it
with respect to the emission tax rate gives:
dAH=dtE
AH
= (1  r) 
pZ + tE
+ r
dn=dtE
n
: (21)
This represents an induced rate of change in the energy-saving technology
level. Thus, by increasing the costs of resource use, the emission tax aects
the energy-saving technology level via two paths. First, the emission tax
makes the rm substitute the natural resource for existing nonpolluting in-
puts. Additionally, there is an indirect eect from an induced variety expan-
sion of intermediates. The emission tax stimulates rents from innovations of
intermediates by increasing the demand for energy-saving technology. Thus,
as the variety of intermediates expands, rm can raise the energy-saving
technology level by adopting not only existing intermediates but also newly
developed ones. As shown below, this second eect on the induced techno-
logical change via the variety expansion of intermediates has an important
eect on the welfare eects of environmental tax reform.
3 Revenue-neutral environmental tax reform
3.1 Welfare eects
We consider here the welfare eects of environmental tax reform by which
increasing emission tax revenue is used to reduce the labor income tax rate
under constant government spending.
Let us begin by dierentiating the utility function with dTR = dG = 0:
dV
dtE
= @v1
@pX
dpX
dtE
+ @v1
@tL
dtL
dtE
 D0(E) dE
dtE
. By using Roy's identity ( represents the
marginal utility of income): @v1
@pX
=  X; @v1
@tL
=  L, the welfare change is
rearranged as follows:
1

dV
dtE
=  XdpX
dtE
  LdtL
dtE
  D
0(E)

dE
dtE
: (22)
Totally dierentiating the government budget constraint (17) gives a pol-
icy rule whereby the income tax rate is reduced with constant government
spending (dG = dTR = 0):
dtL
dtE
=  

E + tE
dE
dtE

+ tL
@L
@pX
dpX
dtE
L+ tL
@L
@tL
: (23)
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When the economy initially satises the conditions that the emission tax rate
is low and the labor market size is large, the income tax rate is successfully
reduced as a result of the revenue-neutral environmental tax reform. This
paper considers this case and assumes that dtL=dtE is strictly negative.
By substituting this policy rule into (22), the welfare change is rewritten
as follows:
1

dV
dtE
=

 D
0(E)

dE
dtE
+

E + tE
dE
dtE

 XdpX
dtE

| {z }
dWP
(24)
+M

E + tE
dE
dtE

| {z }
dWR
+(1 +M)tL
@L
@pX
dpX
dtE| {z }
dWI
;
where M is the marginal welfare cost of income taxation, representing a
partial equilibrium marginal welfare loss via income taxation, weighted by
its marginal revenue. It is dened by M =
 tL @L@tL
L+tL
@L
@tL
.
dWP is the primary welfare eect, describing the welfare gains that arise
when the emission tax rate is increased and its revenue is transferred to house-
holds in a lump-sum fashion, in the absence of preexisting distortionary taxes.
That is, this is the rst-best welfare eect of an emission tax. In particular,
the rst term in dWP is known as the Pigouvian eect, which represents an
improvement in environmental quality measured in monetary terms. The
second is a primary direct eect if emission tax revenues are transferred as
a lump sum. The third is, however, the marginal loss of consumer surplus
in the market for good X, which is called the primary welfare cost, because
it involves an increase in the price of good X as a result of an emission tax.
In the rst-best economy, the optimal emission tax rate is then derived such
that the primary welfare eect becomes zero.
Moreover, the welfare is also inuenced by how the emission tax revenues
are used. The tax reform cuts the income tax rates such that an increase
in the total government revenues from an emission tax is oset. The pre-
existing distortions in the labor market thus can be reduced and, thereby,
there appears a nonenvironmental welfare gain. This eect is known as the
revenue-recycling eect and is written by dWR in (24). That is, this eect
equals zero in the case where the emission tax revenue is transferred as a lump
sum. In contrast, there is another nonenvironmental welfare eect from the
tax-interaction eect. This eect occurs because the increasing emission tax
rate raises the market price of good X, which leads to a relative increase
in price of good X. Then, household behavior that substitutes good X for
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leisure results in a decrease in the preexisting labor tax revenue and, thereby,
prevents tax swapping. At the same time, as decision making on labor{leisure
choice is distorted (the labor supply curve shifts), preexisting distortions per
unit of income tax revenue in the labor market are magnied by 1 +M .
The literature reports that the tax-interaction eect is greater than the
revenue-recycling eect and, therefore, environmental tax reform decreases
market eciencies. This conclusion is brought about by restricted functional
forms for production and emissions. In contrast, by introducing R&D rms,
the present model shows that the magnitude of the tax-interaction eect
depends on the price change of good X in (24), i.e., dpX=dtE. Therefore, to
clarify its magnitude, how the price of good X is aected has to be resolved.
3.2 Induced technological change and price change
As pX = cX , by dierentiating (15) and using emission function (E = Z),
(7), (9), (12), (13) and (20), the eect of the environmental tax reform on
the price of good X is described as follows:4
dcX
dtE
=
E
X

1  cZ
n
dn
dtE

: (25)
The eects on price of the emission tax are shown in two parts. The rst
term is the primary price eect, which represents a direct price rise from the
emission tax. Then, taking the variety of intermediates for energy-saving
technology as given, this term includes only a marginal increase in the pro-
duction cost as a result of the increasing emission tax rate and the substi-
tution of Z for labor and the existing variety of intermediates. In addition,
the second term is the indirect price eect from an induced variety expan-
sion. This term represents a price change via a substitution of Z for newly
developed intermediates for energy saving and its magnitude depends on the
expansion level of the variety, n. Therefore, at the same time as improving
the technology level for energy saving as shown in (21), the new innovations
of intermediates will increase the opportunity of controlling an increase in
the marginal production cost of good X.
Consider the case where the variety of intermediates is xed. Then, the
indirect price eect does not exist and the price change is given simply as
dcX=dtE = E=X. This expression is used commonly in the literature, imply-
ing that the double dividend cannot be obtained under plausible conditions.
The present model, on the other hand, shows that the free entry assumption
characterizes an endogenous variety of intermediates. As shown in (19), the
4Note that E=X = (RcXcR )
x  RcRcZ from the emission function, (7), (12) and (13).
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variety is aected by a change in the demand for energy-saving technology,
H. Dierentiating (19) gives:
dn
dtE
= (1  r) n
H
dH
dtE
: (26)
That is, when the emission tax increases the demand for energy-saving tech-
nology, rents from innovating new intermediates are increased. This leads to
an expansion of the variety of available intermediates.
By using (8), (12) and (20), and considering the feedback eect, a total
change in H by the emission tax is derived as follows:
dH
dtE
=
H
1  r


cZ
 r(1  x)
x
L + r(1  x)xR c1 xR
f1 + r(1  x)gxL + f1 + r(1  x)gxR c1 xR
+
(xL + 
x
R c
1 x
R )
@X=@tL
X
dtL
dtE
f1 + r(1  x)gxL + f1 + r(1  x)gxR c1 xR
#
;(27)
where x is the price elasticity of demand for good X and is assumed to be
strictly less than one: x =  pXX @X@pX and x 2 (0; 1). This expression implies
that there are two paths to stimulate rents for providing intermediates for
energy saving. First, as the emission tax raises the cost of using natural
resources, the rst term in square brackets represents a substitution of the
natural resources for nonpolluting inputs including the energy-saving technol-
ogy. Second, as long as good X is a substitute for leisure (i.e., @X=@tL < 0),
the second term also exhibits an increase in the demand for energy{saving
technology.5 The engine of this term is the tax reform that cuts income tax
rates and increases demand for good X. As a result, this fact requires more
inputs to produce more of good X. Therefore, this second eect arises from
environmental tax reform, while other revenue-neutral and revenue-reducing
policies do not provide it. Both of the two paths thus increase the demand
for energy-saving technology and, thereby, the rents of innovating new inter-
mediates for R&D rms (i.e., dH=dtE > 0).
As dH=dtE > 0, (26) shows that the variety of intermediates is expanded
(i.e., dn=tE > 0). From (21) and (25), the induced variety expansion of inter-
mediates for energy saving thus results in not only the induced technological
change in energy-saving technology level but also the controlled the price rise
of good X. Therefore, the price change is strictly less than the primary price
eect, E=X.
5Considering this second term as a feedback eect for environmental tax reform, we
can rearrange the tax-swapping rule of (23), again. However, the analytical results earned
by doing so are identical to those found by simply using (27), which will be shown below.
To avoid confusing expressions, we use (27) to reveal the welfare eects in the following.
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3.3 Positive externalities from the induced variety ex-
pansion of intermediates for energy saving
Consider a case where the labor income tax rate is zero, tL = 0, and the
emission tax revenue is transferred to the household as a lump sum. That is,
the whole welfare eect in this case corresponds to the primary welfare eect,
dW P , in (24). Then, by using (25), the welfare eects are manipulated as:
1

dV
dtE

tL=0
=

 D
0(E)

+ tE

dE
dtE| {z }
dWE
+cZZ  dn=dtE
n
: (28)
dWE is the primary environmental eect that corresponds to the rst-best
welfare eects from environmental protection when the induced technological
change is not considered. This term is then referred to as the rst dividend
if its sign is positive. Moreover, the present model brings an additional eect
as shown in the last term on the right-hand side of (28). This eect comes
from a controlled price rise whose origin is the induced variety expansion of
intermediates for energy saving. This eect thus creates positive externali-
ties on welfare in the nonenvironmental part of the economy. Consequently,
the rst-best optimal emission tax rate is strictly greater than the marginal
environmental damage in monetary terms:
t1stE =
D0(E)

+
cZ

 
 E
n
dn
dtE
dE
dtE
!
: (29)
3.4 Double dividends in the presence of induced tech-
nological change
As in the literature, let us suppose that the consumption goods are equal
substitutes for leisure. By substituting (25) into (24), the welfare eect of
environmental tax reform can be rearranged as follows (see Appendix A.2 for
the derivation of (30)):
1

dV
dtE
=

 D
0(E)

+ tE

dE
dtE| {z }
dWE
+MtE
dE
dtE| {z }
dWNE1
+(1 +M)cZZ
dn=dtE
n| {z }
dWNE2
: (30)
The welfare eect can be decomposed into the following three eects: pri-
mary environmental eect, dWE, and two nonenvironmental eects, dWNE1
and dWNE2 . The primary environmental eect equals the one shown in the
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rst-best economy. In addition, the rst nonenvirnomental eect (dWNE1 )
occurring in the second-best setting is a summation of the revenue-recycling
eect and a primary part of the tax-interaction eect. The sign of dWNE1 is
negative unless tE = 0 because of the suciently large tax-interaction eect.
The sum of these two eects (i.e., dWE + dWNE1 ) corresponds to that in the
literature which explains that the double dividend cannot be obtained (e.g.,
Goulder et al., 1997).
However, in the presence of the induced technological change, the second
nonenvironmental eect (dWNE2 ) arises via the controlled price rise by the
induced variety expansion of intermediates, and its sign is positive regardless
of the initial emission tax rate. The two nonenvironmental eects, dWNE1 +
dWNE2 , are referred to as the second dividend if the sum of these eects is
strictly positive. Then, note that when the initial emission tax rate is zero,
dWNE1 equals zero, whereas dW
NE
2 remains positive. That is, the sum of these
two nonenvironmental eects is positive, at least, in a range of suciently
low emission tax rates. Then, as both dWE and dWNE1 + dW
NE
2 are strictly
positive at the same time, the double dividend can be obtained.
4 Further discussions
4.1 Magnitude of the rst dividend
Bento and Jacobsen (2007) derive the trade-o between the rst and second
dividends by showing that emission tax burdens are not fully transferred to
the price of polluting goods as well as in the present model. The trade-
o arises in their model because of an assumption that pollution emissions
increase with respect to the total output of good X. Then, the modest price
rise of polluting goods relative to an increase in the emission tax rate implies
a modest decrease in the quantity of traded polluting goods in size. Thus,
instead of decreasing the tax-interaction eect, the pollution reduction (the
rst dividend) also becomes small.
In contrast, this result does not hold in the present model because pollu-
tion emissions arise from resource use as an input and the positive externali-
ties from the induced variety expansion. To show this, the emission function,
E = Z, is dierentiated with respect to the emission tax rate and rearranged
by using (7):
dE
dtE
=
dE
dtE

dn
dtE
=0
  r(1  x)
x
L + r(1  x)xR c1 xR
xL + 
x
R c
1 x
R
 E  dn=dtE
n
:
The rst term is the amount of reduced emissions in the case where the vari-
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ety of intermediates is xed.6 The second term exhibits a further eect that
reduces emissions through the induced variety expansion of intermediates be-
cause the polluting rm can substitute not only existing nonpolluting inputs
but also newly developed intermediates for polluting inputs. The variety
expansion enforces the rst dividend and, consequently, breaks the trade-o
between the rst and second dividends.
4.2 Comparison of the optimal emission tax rates
Here, the optimal emission tax rates in the rst- and the second-best settings
are compared. By setting the left-hand side of (30) to be zero and using (29),
the second-best optimal emission tax rate is given as:
t2ndE = t
1st
E  
M
1 +M
D0(E)

:
That is, the second-best emission tax rate is strictly less than the rst-best
level even if environmental tax reform brings about the double dividend.
The literature uses the optimal emission tax rates in the rst- and the
second-best settings to distinguish whether the double dividend is obtained.
However, the present paper indicates that this approach is not available.
5 Conclusion
This paper studied the welfare eects of environmental tax reform in the
presence of an induced technological change in energy saving. The energy-
saving technology is described as a composite of intermediates that helps in
producing a given amount of energy services with a small amount of a natural
resource. These intermediates are innovated by R&D rms and supplied
under monopolistic competition. Then, the paper shows that a combination
of these intermediates endogenously constructs the energy-saving technology.
Using this model, the paper found two paths where the technological
change is induced by an emission tax. The rst path is a substitution of
6This term is given as:
dE
dtE

dn
dtE
=0
= E

  
cZ
f1  r(1  x)gxL + f1  r(1  x)gxR c1 xR
xL + 
x
R c
1 x
R
+
@X=@tL
X
dtL
dtE

:
The second term implies that environmental tax reform increases pollution emissions by
cutting income tax rates and increasing demand for good X. However, this term is suf-
ciently small so that previous numerical simulations as in Goulder et al. (1997) show a
change in the pollution emission to be negative under plausible parameter sets.
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the polluting natural resource for existing nonpolluting inputs including the
intermediates for energy saving. The second is an induced variety expansion
of intermediates that occurs because the emission tax increases demand for
energy-saving technology and raises rents from innovating new intermediates.
Then, the polluting rm can also adopt the newly developed intermediates
to substitute for resource use. Therefore, these two paths construct a cleaner
production process when the emission tax is raised.
The induced variety expansion of intermediates then prevents a full trans-
fer of marginal emission costs from increased emission tax rates to the price
of a nal good so that it derives positive externalities on welfare. It reduces
the eciency costs of environmental tax reform which arise via a price rise
of nal goods. Therefore, the second (nonenvironmental) dividend can be
obtained, at least, in a range of suciently low emission tax rates. Further-
more, considering the magnitude of the rst (environmental) dividend, the
paper reveals that the induced variety expansion also accelerates a reduction
of pollution emissions and, thereby, enforces the rst dividend. However,
even if the double dividend is obtained, the second-best optimal emission
tax rate cannot be greater than rst-best tax rate.
Appendix
A.1 Derivation of factor demand functions
The polluting rm faces the following minimization problem for total cost:
minLX ;Z;h(i) 8i2[0;n] (5); s.t. E = Z, (1), (2) and (3).
To derive demand functions for the respective factor inputs, we solve this
problem in three steps: (i)h(); (ii) H and Z; and (iii) R and LX .
At the rst step, the polluting rm determines the optimal combination
of intermediates related to energy saving, taking H as given:
min
h(i) 8i2[0;n]
Z n
0
pH(i)h(i)di s.t.(3) (A.1)
Solving this problem results in the factor demand for intermediates of (6). By
substituting (6) into (A.1), we obtain the following minimized cost of a variety
of intermediates for energy saving and emission abatement: (A.1)': cHH.
Therefore, cH can be considered to be a minimized marginal cost to satisfy
a given amount of energy-saving technology, given as (10).
By using (A.1)', at the second step and taking R as given, the polluting
rm considers an optimal combination of natural resource and energy-saving
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technology input by solving the following problem:
min
Z;H
pZZ + cHH + tEE; (A.2)
s.t. E = Z and (2):
Thus, the factor demand functions for Z and H are written as in (7) and
(8), and we dene the unit cost of the natural resource use in manipulation,
shown in (9). Furthermore, substituting (7), (8) and (9) into (A.2) gives:
(A.2)': cRR, where cR is a minimized marginal cost of providing a given
amount of energy services, shown in (13).
Finally, at the third step, the polluting rm should decide on an opti-
mal combination of labor and energy services, given X, by minimizing the
rearranged cost function (5), as follows:
min
R;LX
wLX + cRR; s.t.(1): (A.3)
Therefore, the respective factor demand functions are given as shown in (11)
and (12). As well as the above, the substitution of (11) and (12) determines
(14).
A.2 Derivation of (30)
Using (25), we rearrange (24) as follows:
1

dV
dtE
=

 D
0(E)

dE
dtE
+ tE
dE
dtE
+ cZZ
dn=dtE
n

+MtE
dE
dtE
  (1 +M) tL
X
@L
@pX
cZZ
dn=tE
n
: (A.4)
The portion of the tax-interaction eect, tL
X
@L
@pX
, is rewritten as:   M
1+M
L
X
@L=@pX
@L=@tL
.
Slutsky equations and Slutsky's symmetry property are used to rearrange this
expression as:
tL
X
@L
@pX
=   M
1 +M
L
X
X
1 tL

1 tL
X
@Xc
@1 tL +
@L
@I
(1  tL)

L
1 tL

1 tL
L
@Lc
@tL
+ @L
@I
(1  tL)
 ; (A.5)
where the superscript c stands for the compensated demand functions, and
I is disposable income.
By taking the total derivative of household utility and assuming that
the utility level is unchanged, the compensated demand function has the
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following relation, from its denition: (1   tL) @Lc@1 tL = pX @X
c
@1 tL + pY
@Y c
@1 tL .
Substituting this relation into (A.5) gives:
tL
X
@L
@pX
=   M
1 +M
cXL + LI
pXX
(1 tL)L
c
XL +
pY Y
(1 tL)L
c
Y L + LI
 ;
where cXL =
1 tL
X
@Xc
@1 tL ; 
c
Y L =
1 tL
Y
@Y c
@1 tL ; LI =  (1   tL)@L@I . Therefore,
by assuming that goods X and Y are equal substitutes for leisure, that is,
cXL = 
c
Y L, because all income is spent on consumption goods, (A.5) is
written in reduced form as  M=(1 +M). By substituting this into (A.4),
(30) is obtained.
References
[1] Bento, A.M. and Jacobsen, M. (2007) `Ricardian Rents, Environmental Policy
and the `Double-dividend' Hypothesis', Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 53(1), 17{31
[2] Bovenberg, A.L. and de Mooij, R.A. (1994) `Environmental Levies and Distor-
tionary Taxation', American Economic Review 84(4), 1085{1089
[3] Bovenberg, A.L. (1999) `Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: An
Updated Reader's Guide', International Tax and Public Finance 6(3), 421{443
[4] Bovenberg, A.L., Goulder, L.H. and Gurney, D.J. (2005) `Eciency Costs of
Meeting Industry-Distributional Constraints under Environmental Permits and
Taxes', RAND Journal of Economics 36(4), 951{971
[5] Buonanno, P., Carraro, C., and Galeotti, M. (2001) `Endogenous Induced Tech-
nological Change and the Costs of Kyoto', Resource and Energy Economics
25(1), 11{34
[6] Dixit, A.K. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1977) `Monopolistic Competition and Optimal
Product Diversity', American Economic Review 67(3), 297{308
[7] Goulder, L.H. (1995) `Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A
Reader's Guide', International Tax and Public Finance 2(2), 155{182
[8] Goulder, L.H., Parry, I.W.H. and Burtraw, D. (1997) `Revenue-Raising versus
Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Signicance of
Preexisting Tax Distortions', RAND Journal of Economics 28(4), 708{731
[9] Goulder, L.H. and Mathai, K. (2000) `Optimal CO2 Abatement in the Presence
of Induced Technological Change', Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 39(1), 1{38
20
[10] Goulder, L.H. and Schneider, S.H. (1999) `Induced Technological Change and
the Attractiveness of CO2 Abatement Policies', Resource and Energy Economics
21(3{4), 211{253
[11] Jae, A.B., Newell, R.G. and Staivins, R.N. (2002) `Environmental Policy
and Technological Change', Environmental and Resource Economics 22(1{2),
41{69
[12] Loschel, A. (2002) `Technological Change in Economic Models of Environ-
mental Policy: A survey', Ecological Economics 43(2{3), 105{126
[13] Parry, I.W.H. (1995) `Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling', Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 29(3), S64{S77
[14] Parry, I.W.H. and Bento, A.M. (2000) `Tax Deductions, Environmental Pol-
icy, and the \Double Dividend" Hypothesis', Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management 39(1), 67{96
[15] Popp, D., Newell, R.G. and Jae, A.B. (2009) `Energy, the Environment, and
Technological Change', NBER Working Paper 14832
[16] Romer, P. (1990) `Endogenous Technological Change', Journal of Political
Economy 98(S5), S71{S102
[17] Schwartz, J. and Repetto, R. (1997) `Nonseparable Utility and the Double
Dividend Debate: Reconsidering the Tax-International Eect', Environmental
and Resource Economics 15(2), 149{157
[18] Smulders, J.A. and de Nooij, M. (2003) `The Impact of Energy Conservation
on Technology and Economic Growth', Resource and Energy Economics 25(1),
59{79
[19] Williams, R.C. III (2002) `Environmental Tax Interactions When Pollution
Aects Health or Productivity', Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement 44(2), 261{270
[20] Yamagami, H. (2009) `Health Eects, Tax Deductions for Medical Expendi-
ture, and the Double Dividend', FinanzArchiv/ Public Finance Analysis 65(1),
105{121
21
